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NOTES
A REVIEW OF BARNES V GLEN THEATRE, INC. CALLS
FOR A REEXAMINATION OF THE O'BRIEN TEST
If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment,
it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.'
-William J.Brennan, Jr.,
Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, 1956-1990
I. INTRODUCTION

These words reflected the Supreme Court's view of the First Amendment as recently as three years ago. Yet in the recent case of Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc.,2 in which the Court was confronted with a challenge
to an Indiana statute banning nude dancing, an activity protected by the
First Amendment, the Court found the law to be constitutional. In so
doing, the Court acknowledged the values embodied in Justice Brennan's
words above-then undermined them.
In a five-to-four decision, a "confused and fractured majority"3 of the
Court reversed the en banc ruling of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
and upheld Indiana's regulatory scheme. In reaching its conclusion that
Indiana may prohibit nude dancing, the Supreme Court based nearly all of
its analysis upon an application of the O'Brien test, a four-part inquiry
articulated in United States v. O'Brien.'
This Note first will examine the O'Brien test and its application in
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.5 Next, this Note will focus on the extent to
which the result in Barnes calls for a reexamination of the O'Brien test.6
Following this inquiry, some recommendations for the test's future use will
1. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
2. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
3. John P. Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress,59 U. CI. L. REV. 13, 15
(992).
4. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
5. See infra part 1V.A-B.
6. See infra part IV.B-D.
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be offered and explored. From these recommendations it is hoped that a
new First Amendment methodology may be forged-a methodology not
only effective enough to handle difficult free speech issues like those raised
in Barnes, but also durable enough to survive without needing to be
redesigned at every turn.
1. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW: THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Perhaps no right is more sacred and revered in our constitutional
scheme than the right to free expression. The right to express oneself free
from governmental intervention is secured by the Constitution's "most
majestic guarantee,"' the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.9
Justice Brandeis believed that the Constitution was premised upon the
notion that the "freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth."'"
Similarly, Justice Holmes, in defending the virtues of a political system that
places a high value on free speech, stressed the importance of "free trade
in ideas.""
Through the course of our country's history, the Supreme Court has
developed a framework for analyzing governmental restrictions on speech.
In general, the First Amendment protects speech from governmental
intrusion. However, not all speech is equally protected. There are certain
categories of expression that the Court has deemed to be beyond the First
Amendment's protection. The Court has ruled, for instance, that the
government may prohibit speech that threatens to incite violent or illegal
conduct.' The Court has also held that the First Amendment does not
extend to so-called fighting words-words "which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."' 3
7. See infra part V.
8. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 785 (2d ed. 1988).
9. The Fist Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make
U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The Free Speech
no law... abridging the freedom of speech ....
Clause was made applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
10. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring),
overruledby Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
ll. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
12. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The Court held that the state may not
forbid advocacy of the use of force or the violation of the law except where the advocacy is
directed to inciting imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such action. Id. at 447.
13. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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Similarly, the Court has concluded that speech determined to be obscene,
according to certain standards, is unprotected.' 4 Finally, the Court has
held that speech depicting child pornography also falls outside the
protection of the First Amendment. 5
A. ProtectedSpeech: Content-Basedvs. Content-Neutral
If the government attempts to restrict speech falling outside of the
unprotected categories, the Court will analyze the restriction to determine
if the First Amendment has, in fact, been violated. The Supreme Court's
First Amendment analytical framework has been characterized as consisting
of two "tracks."' 6 The first track provides a rigorous level of scrutiny to
government restrictions of protected speech while the second track provides
one less demanding."
The first track applies to regulations which are content-based-those
that seek to discourage or prohibit speech because of its very message.'
A statute banning, for instance, discussion of a political candidate is an
example of a content-based regulation. 9 The government has extremely
limited power to restrict expression because of its message, ideas, or subject
matter. If a regulation is content-based, it is subjected to strict scrutiny."'
To satisfy this standard, the government must show that the law (1)
promotes a compelling interest, and (2) is narrowly tailored to achieve that
2
interest. '
The second track is reserved for content-neutral restrictions-those
aimed not at content but at some noncommunicative aspect of speech."
A statute prohibiting loudspeakers in residential neighborhoods is an
14. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Court defined obscenity according to the
following standards:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would
find that the [speech], taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether
the [speech] depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the [speech], taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972)) (citation omitted).
15. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
16. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 12-2, at 789-92.
17. See id. at 791-92.
18. Id. at 789.

19. See i&(citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966)).
20. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
21. Id.
22. See TRIBE, supra note 8.§ 12-2, at 792.
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example of a content-neutral restriction on speech.'
The statute is
unconcerned with the content of any messages that might be broadcast and
seeks the reduction of noise as its only purpose. In general, content-neutral
restrictions are constitutional unless they unduly constrict the flow of
information or ideas.' A content-neutral regulation, though targeting the
noncommunicative aspects of speech, may nonetheless have an adverse
impact on speech. If the impact is severe, the regulation may be invalidated depending on the level of governmental interest sought to be protected.2 The Court must balance the various interests involved and make a
determination.
B. Expressive Conduct
In First Amendment analysis, not only is the subject matter of speech
significant, but so is the way in which the speech is expressed. Up to this
point, this discussion has assumed that the speech involved has been
expressed in a traditional manner, the written or spoken word. This
traditional type of speech is known as pure speech. 6 The Supreme Court
has recognized, however, that speech conveyed in indirect ways, such as
through conduct, is likewise protected by the First Amendment
Speech
expressed by conduct is known as symbolic speech or expressive con28

duct.

The standard of review for evaluating restrictions on expressive
conduct is less demanding than that used for evaluating restrictions on pure
speech.2 9 The Court first expressly articulated this standard of review in
United States v. O'Brien.30 Under the O'Brien test, a regulation of

expressive conduct is justified if: (1) it is within the constitutional power
of the government, (2) it furthers a substantial governmental interest, (3) the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and
23. See id. at 790 (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)).

24. TRIBE, supra note 8, § 12-2, at 792.
25. 1d
26. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (1991) (Souter, J.,
concurring).
27. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (burning American flag is protected
speech); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing
armbands is protected speech); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (flying flag is
protected speech).
28. See, e.g., Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460.
29. See generally United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1969).
30. Id
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(4) the incidental restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are no greater
than is necessary to the furtherance of that interest."
C. Nude Dancing
The Supreme Court has held that nude dancing is expressive conduct
protected by the First Amendment? 2 In finding that nude dancing does
not fall into the unprotected category of obscenity, the Court has stated that
"nudity alone does not place otherwise protected material outside the
mantle of the First Amendment."'33 The precise level of protection the
Court has given to nude dancing, however, has never been clearly
articulated.
The Court first announced that nude dancing was entitled to protection
in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim.34 In Schad, the Court struck
down as violative of the First Amendment a zoning ordinance prohibiting
all adult entertainment. 3 But, because the holding in Schad rested upon
overbreadth grounds, 6 no clear standard of review emerged for evaluating
restrictions as they applied specifically to nude dancing. It was clear,
however, that any such standard would not be exceedingly strict.38 The
Schad Court, in articulating the level of protection afforded nude dancing,
held that nude dancing was "not without its protections ....
Despite the absence of clearly defined guidelines, a pattern has
emerged in the Court's treatment of nude dancing and other adult
entertainment. The Court's focus seems to be on the kind of restriction the
government has chosen to employ. The Schad Court used overbreadth
analysis.' In California v. LaRue,41 the Court's decision to affirm a
31. Id. at 377.
32. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim. 452 U.S 61, 66 (1981). In an overbreadth or
facial challenge, litigants are permitted to challenge a statute not on the basis that their own rights
of free expression might have been violated, but because the law, on its face, might cause others
to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413

U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
37. See Schad, 452 U.S. at 66.
38. See generally FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding that offensive or
indecent speech merits a lesser degree of protection).
39. Schad 452 U.S. at 66.
40. See id,
41. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
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regulation of nude dancing hinged upon the states' exclusive power under
the Twenty-First Amendment4 2 to regulate establishments serving alcohol.43 In these cases, the analysis and discussion centered not on the level
of scrutiny necessary to protect nude dancing as expression, but on the
appropriate inquiry for the type of restriction at hand. In this respect, as we
shall see, Barnes was no exception."

III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: BARNEs V. GLEN THEATRE, INC.
The Kitty Kat Lounge, an establishment serving alcoholic beverages
in South Bend, Indiana, desired to offer its patrons totally nude "go-go
dancing" entertainment. 45 Indiana's public indecency statute, however,
prohibited anyone from appearing nude in a public place." Indiana
officials interpreted the statute to require the dancers to wear G-strings47
and pasties" during their performances.4 9 In 1985, the Kitty Kat
Lounge, along with another such establishment, the Glen Theatre, and two
nude dancers working there (hereinafter the "respondents" collectively),
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
42. The Twenty-First Amendment to the Constitution provides: "The transportation or
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein
of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST.

amend. XXI, § 2.
43. See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
44. See infra part TV.
45. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., I11 S. Ct. 2456, 2458 (1991).
46. Indiana's public indecency statute provides that:
(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:
(1) Engages in sexual intercourse;
(2) Engages in deviate sexual conduct;
(3) Appears in a state of nudity; or
(4) Fondles the genitals of himself or another person;
commits public indecency, a Class A misdemeanor.
(b) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area,
or buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast
with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the showing of
covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-1 (Bums 1985).
47. "[A] loincloth or breechcloth, usually secured by a cord at the waist." RANDoM HoUSE
DICTIoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 846 (2d ed. 1987).
48. "[A] pair of small, cuplike coverings for the nipples of a striptease dancer... ." ML at
1420.
49. See Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2460.
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Indiana.-'
Seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Indiana statute, the
respondents argued that the statute was facially overbroad. 5 They also
contended that the statute, as applied to their nude dancing, improperly
interfered with their right to free expression under the First Amendment.n
A. Holdings of the Lower Courts
The district court granted the injunctive relief and struck down the
statute, finding it to be facially overbroad 5 3 The Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that the interpretation previously given to the
statute by the Indiana Supreme Court insulated the law from a challenge for
overbreadth.' The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to determine whether the statute, as applied to nude dancing, violated
the First Amendment.'5
On remand, the district court upheld the statute, finding that the nude
dancing sought to be performed was not expressive activity protected by the
First Amendment.5 6 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit again reversed,
holding that nude dancing was expressive conduct and thus protected by the
50. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Civil City of South Bend, 726 F. Supp. 728 (ND. Ind. 1985), rev'd
sub nom. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Pearson, 802 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1986), on remand Glen Theatre
v. Civil City of South Bend, 695 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. Ind. 1988). rev'd sub nom. Miller v. Civil
City of South Bend, 887 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1989), affd, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (en bane),
rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
51. Id. at 731; see supra note 37.
52. Id
53. Id. at 732-33.
54. See Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Pearson, 802 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1986), on remand Glen Theatre,
Inc. v. Civil City of South Bend, 695 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. Ind. 1988), rev'd sub nom. Miller v.
Civil City of South Bend, 887 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (en
band), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. CL 2456 (1991). In State v.
Baysinger, 397 N.E.2d 580 (1979), appeal dismissed sub nom. Clark v. Indiana, 446 U.S. 931
(1980), the Indiana Supreme Court limited the application of § 35-45-4-1, stating that "[Indiana]
may be constitutionally required to tolerate... some nudity as a part of some larger form of
expression meriting protection, when the communication of ideas is involved." Id. at 587.
55. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Pearson, 802 F.2d at 291.
56. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Civil City of South Bend, 695 F. Supp. 414, 419 (N.D. Ind. 1988),
rev'd sub nom. Miller Civil City of South Bend, 887 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 904 F.2d
1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (en bane), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456
(1991).

106 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 13

First Amendment.:" After a rehearing en banc,s 8 a majority of the
Seventh Circuit agreed that nude dancing was protected expression and that
Indiana's public indecency statute impermissibly infringed upon that
expression:5 9 In reaching its decision, the Seventh Circuit noted that
"[s]exual expression which is... not obscene is protected by the First
Amendment."60
B. Holding of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court granted certiorari61 and reversed the Seventh
Circuit.62 Although the Justices differed widely in their reasoning, a fiveto-four majority upheld the statute.' A four member bloc consisting of
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter
concluded that while nude dancing was entitled to marginal protection
under the First Amendment, Indiana's regulation of public nudity was not
an impermissible interference." Justice Scalia, also upholding the statute,
rested his decision on other grounds and wrote a separate concurring
opinion. Justice Souter also filed a concurring opinion. Justices White,
Marshall, Blackmnn, and Stevens dissented from the Court's holding.
1. The Plurality Opinion
The Chief Justice, writing for a three-member plurality which included
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, found nude dancing to be expressive
conduct and thus subjected Indiana's statute to a lessened degree of
scrutiny.6 5 Applying the test articulated in United States v. O'Brien, the
57. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 887 F.2d 826, 829 (7th Cir. 1989), aff'd, 904 F.2d
1081 (1990) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
58. "[Ihe Circuit Courts of Appeal usually sit in panels of [three] judges but for important
cases may expand the bench to a larger number when they are said to be sitting en banc."

BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 526-27 (6th ed. 1990); see FED. R. APP. P. 35.
59. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd sub
nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
60. Id. at 1086 (quotations omitted). All parties agreed that the nude dancing sought to be
performed was not obscene. Ld.at 1082.
61. 111 S. Ct. 38 (1990).
62. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., III S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
63. See id

64. See I.
65. See id at 2460 (plurality opinion).
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plurality held that the Indiana statute was constitutional."
The plurality determined that the public indecency statute satisfied
O'Brien's first requirement that the regulation be within the constitutional
power of the government.' Indiana's public indecency law was within
the states' traditional police power to provide for the public health, safety,
and morals." The plurality observed that at the time of the decision,
similar public indecency statutes were in effect in at least forty-seven
states.6 9
Applying the second criterion of the O'Brien test, the plurality
concluded that the Indiana statute furthered a substantial governmental
interest-namely, that of protecting order and morality. 0 The Chief
Justice quoted from the noted case of Bowers v. Hardwick7t to support the
observation
that "[t]he law... is constantly based on notions of morali72
ty.,
The plurality next determined that the third criterion of the O'Brien
test was satisfied-that Indiana's purpose in banning public nudity was
unrelated to the suppression of free expression.' The plurality reasoned
that dancers who are required to wear only pasties and G-strings are not
thereby prevented from expressing their erotic message.74 As the Chief
Justice noted: "[Tihe requirement that the dancers don pasties and a Gstring does not deprive the dance of whatever erotic message it conveys; it
simply makes the message slightly less graphic."
The fourth criterion of the O'Brien test requires that the incidental
restriction on First Amendment freedoms be no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of the governmental interest.76 The plurality concluded
that the statute was "narrowly tailored" to achieve its end, the elimination
of public nudity.7 Therefore, the plurality reasoned, the incidental restric66. See id. at 2460-63. Plurality opinions, as they are not endorsed by a majority of the
Court, carry less precendential value under the doctrine of stare decisis. BARRON'S LAW
DIcnoNARY 327 (1984).
67. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2461 (1991) (plurality opinion).
68. Id. at 2462.
69. Id at 2461.
70. Id at 2462.
71. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a ban on homosexual sodomy).
72. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (1991) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Bowers, 478 U.S at 196).
73. Id
74. Id at 2463.
75. Id.
76. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
77. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456,2463 (1991).
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tions on free expression are no greater than is essential. 78 "Indiana's
requirement that the dancers wear at least pasties and a G-string," the Chief
Justice claimed, "is modest, and the bare minimum necessary to achieve the
state's purpose." 9
2. The Concurring Opinions
a. Justice Souter
Justice Souter concurred in the result and filed a separate opinion in
Barnes. ° Interestingly, the concurrence represents Justice Souter's first
discussion of the First Amendment as a member of the Supreme Courts1
Justice Souter agreed with the plurality that nude dancing is expressive
conduct within the purview of the First Amendment.' He also agreed
with the plurality that the O'Brien test supplied the appropriate level of
83
scrutiny.
The Justice did not agree, however, with the plurality's analysis under
the second criterion of the O'Brien test. In Justice Souter's view, the
protection of public morality does not advance a substantial governmental
interest." Instead, the Justice rested his decision on the sufficiency of
Indiana's interest in regulating the so-called secondary effects of nude
dancing.' According to Justice Souter, the secondary effects of nude
dancing include prostitution, sexual assault, and other criminal activity.8 6
Justice Souter went on to conclude that Indiana's statute satisfied the
remainder of the O'Brien test.'
78. Id
79. Id
80. Id.at 2468 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
81. Ingrid Kristin Campagne, Note, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.: Application of Indiana's
Public Indecency Statute to Nude Dancing-Is the Supreme Court Stripping Away First
Amendment Protection to Reveal a New Standard?25 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 595, 606 n.98 (1992)
(asserting that Barnes represents the Court's development of a theory of 'lesser value speech").
82. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (1991) (Souter, J.,
concurring).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. I at 2468-69; see also infra part IV.C.
86. Id at 2469.
87. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2471 (1991) (Souter, J.,
concurring).
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b. Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia believed that the respondents' activities in Barnes did

not implicate the First Amendment."8 In his view, nude dancing is not
expression meriting constitutional protection. 9 The key inquiry to Justice
Scalia is whether the statute in question is targeted at expression." In this

case, the Justice believed Indiana's statute to be a general proscription of
conduct and not one related to expression.91 Statutes like the one in
Barnes are unrelated to expression, the Justice reasoned, "unless we view
...topless hot dog vendors as speech."'92 Accordingly, Justice Scalia
would have required Indiana's statutory scheme to meet only a "rational
basis" test.93
3. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens,

dissented from the Court's holding." The dissent readily agreed with the
plurality that the respondents' nude dancing fell within the purview of the
First Amendment as protected expression. 95 However, the dissent did not
agree that Indiana's statute was constitutional."
Specifically, the dissent believed that O'Brien's third criterion-requiring that the statute's purpose be unrelated to suppression of

expression-had not been satisfied. 7 Justice White reasoned that since
nudity was an expressive ingredient of the dance,9 8 requiring the dancers
to wear pasties and G-strings will necessarily change the essence of their
performance, and thus their message." Therefore, the dissent believed
88. Id at 2463 (Sealia, J., concurring).
89. Id at 2463-64.
90. Id at 2465.
91. 1&
92. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. CL 2456, 2464 (1991) (Scalia, L, concurring)
(quotations omitted).
93. Id.at 2468. The rational basis test is the least restrictive level of review applied by the
Court. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 543 (1989) (opinion of Justice
Blackmaun). A challenged law will satisfy this standard if there is merely a rational basis for its
enactment. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
94. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2471 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
95. 1&at 2472.
96. I41 at 2476.
97. li at 2473-74.
98. ld. at 2474.
99. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2474 (1991) (White, L,dissenting).
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that such a regulation must have as its purpose the suppression of expression."® Accordingly, the dissent would have subjected the Indiana statute
to strict scrutiny. WI
While both the majority and dissent left open the question of whether
Indiana's interests in this case might be compelling, the dissent took the
view that, in any event, the regulation was not narrowly drawn.'02 Justice
White pointed out that banning an entire category of expressive activity,
such as occurred here, normally will not satisfy the Court's narrow tailoring
requirement. 3 In response to Justice Souter's concurring opinion, the
dissent suggested some alternative strategies that Indiana officials might
have employed to tailor their regulatory scheme more narrowly toward
combating the secondary effects of nude dancing. These alternatives
included prescribing that a minimum distance be kept between dancers and
spectators, limiting nude entertainment to certain hours, and dispersing
throughout the city those establishments providing nude entertainment."°
IV. ANALYSIS

The Barnes Court based almost all of its analysis on the O'Brien test.
The test, however, was carelessly developed by the Warren Court"0 5 and,
consequently, fails to address adequately the free speech issues implicated
in Barnes.1
This is first evidenced by the Barnes Court's troubling
application of the test." 7 The problem is further underscored by the fact
that the statute in Barnes, in practice, acts as a content-based restriction-a
type of regulation the O'Brien test is wholly unsuited to evaluate."
Indeed, if the O'Brien test is expected to remain an effective part of the
Court's free speech methodology, it must be significantly improved."0 9
Otherwise, it must ultimately be discarded."'

Professor Keith Werhan"' has said: "[The Court's O'Brien machin100. See id.
101. Ia
102. Idat 2475.
103. Id
104. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. CL 2456, 2475 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
105. See infra part V.A.1.
106. See infra part IV.A.2.
107. See infra part IV.B.
108. See infra part IV.C.
109. See infra part V.A.
110. See infra part VM.
11. Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law.
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ery requires calibration.... Another commentator has called the O'Brien
decision the "most troubling illustration" of the Court's approach to
content-neutral restrictions' and a '"[p]rime candidatel] for reexamination.""' As will be shown, the Court's application of the O'Brien test to
Barnes demonstrates the continuing validity of these observations.
A. Development of the O'Brien Test
On March 31, 1966, David O'Brien, before a sizeable crowd on the
steps of the South Boston Courthouse, burned his draft card in protest of
the Vietnam War."' O'Brien was arrested and later convicted of violating a federal statute prohibiting the destruction of draft cards. 1 6 O'Brien
challenged his conviction, arguing that the statute violated his First
Amendment right to free speech. 17 The Supreme Court, in an opinion
authored by then Chief Justice Warren, found O'Brien's activities to be
expressive conduct, thus meriting lessened protection under the First
Amendment." 8 The O'Brien Court concluded that:
A government regulation [of expressive conduct] is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. 11 9
Applying its analysis, the Court upheld O'Brien's conviction.12
112. Keith Werhan, The O'Briening of FreeSpeech Methodology, 19 ARIz. ST. LJ. 635, 649
n.87 (1987).
113. Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in FirstAmendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L.
REv. 113, 126 (1981).
114. Id at 146.
115. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369-70 (1968); Werhan, supranote 112, at
635.
116. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369.
117. See generally O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967), vacated 391 U.S.
367 (1968).
118. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77.
119. Id. at 377.
120. Id at 386.
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1. The O'Brien Court
It can hardly be said that the O'Brien test arose from a Court that was
indifferent to First Amendment values.'
The Warren Court handed
down many decisions in which free speech values were exalted in spirit as
well as result.'
Despite this seeming commitment to the First Amendment, the O'Brien Court has been criticized as disposing of its free-speech
issues in an "astonishingly cavalier manner."'" Thus, the problems with
the O'Brien test may have arisen more out of carelessness or neglect rather
than indifference or disdain.
[The O'Brien Court] chose not to deal with the complexities of
the matter ....
[I]t made no attempt to discuss, let alone to
answer, the difficult and disturbing constitutional questions
presented. Instead, it trivialized the issues and handed down an
opinion that has all the deceptive simplicity and superficial force
that can usually be achieved by begging the question. 24
This failure to appreciate the complex free-speech issues in O'Brien is
surely at the root of the problems caused by the Court's later application
of the test to Barnes."
Justice Frankfurter, in discussing the First Amendment, once warned:
"History teaches that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when
courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary
responsibility in choosing between competing political, economic and social
pressures."''
It is possible that the O'Brien Court was so concerned with
the social and political issues surrounding the Vietnam War that the
decision was overly result-oriented and thus a poorly crafted tool for future
use. The Barnes case, taking the O'Brien test to the extreme, fully exposes
the test's imperfections. And, while the Barnes decision may not quite
threaten the independence of the judiciary, as feared by Justice Frankfurter,
121. See Dean Alfange, Jr., Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-CardBurning
Case, 1968 Sup. Cr. Rnv. 1, 1 (1968).
122. See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (reversing conviction for violation

of statute prohibiting public mutilation of the flag); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)
(reversing conviction for violation of statute prohibiting possession of obscene material);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (reversing conviction for violation of
statute prohibiting advocacy of criminal acts).
123. Alfange, supra note 121, at 2.
124. Id. at 3.
125. See infra part V.B.
126. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in

affirmance).
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it most certainly jeopardizes the free-speech values that make up the very
fabric of the First Amendment.
2. O'Brien Balancing and Scrutiny
Scholars have sharply criticized the O'Brien test as not providing a
sufficient balancing of free speech interests. Because all four prongs focus
only on the challenged law,"z the test has been assailed as not requiring
any real measurement of the expression sought to be regulated." Cases
involving restrictions of expressive conduct, critics contend, "can hardly be
satisfactorily decided by means of a formula that makes it unnecessary to
evaluate [a statute's] impact upon speech."' 2 9 The result is that the
O'Brien test provides an empty analysis which invariably results in the
challenged restriction on expression being upheld. 3 ' 'The [O'Brien] test
nowhere asks whether the asserted governmental interest is sufficiently
substantial to justify the incidental impact on free expression. Under these
conditions, it is practically inconceivable that an asserted governmental
purpose will not qualify."''
This lack of serious balancing within the O'Brien test predictably has
led commentators to scoff at the level of protection it provides for
expressive conduct. Harvard Law Professor John Hart Ely has characterized the O'Brien test's scrutiny as a useless approach that would uphold all
but "gratuitous inhibitions" of speech. 3 ' Similarly, Professor Werhan has
contending that the test operates
decried O'Brien's "lowly" scrutiny,"
as a "presumption of nonprotection" for expression sought to be regulated.134
On its face, the O'Brien test appears to require a demanding analysis
akin to strict scrutiny. The Court seemed to create a test well-suited to
identifying unlawful restrictions on expressive conduct. Closer examination
127. Alfange, supra note 121, at 18.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Werhan, supra note 112, at 655 n.124; see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral
Restrictions, 54 U. CH. L REV 46, 50-52 (1987); John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case
Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in FirstAmendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L
REV. 1482, 1485-86 (1975); David S. Day, The Incidental Regulation of Free Speech, 42 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 491, 505 (1988).
131. Redish, supra note 113, at 127.
132. Ely, supra note 130, at 1485.
133. Werhan, supra note 112, at 647-48.
134. Id. at 645.
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reveals, however, that, in practice, the O'Brien
test provides a level of
35
scrutiny that has been described as "useless."'
The language used by the O'Brien Court may be the root of this
apparent deceptiveness. In defining the level of scrutiny that it was about
to apply, the O'Brien Court discussed the level of government interest
sufficient to sustain a restriction on expressive conduct. The Court declared
that such an interest must be either "compelling" or "substantial.' 13 1 The
Court's use of the term "compelling" might signal to many that a form of
"strict scrutiny" was to be applied. A "substantial interest' requirement,
however, has been found only in lower levels of scrutiny.'" By equating
terms that traditionally have been used in distinct situations, the O'Brien
Court has actually amplified
the very imprecision that it had complained
' 13
"inheres in these terms.
At first, the distinction between the terms "compelling" and "substantial" may seem trifling. But, after considering the importance the Court has
attached to these two terms and the practical result of using each, the
significance becomes clear. A compelling interest is "a matter of truly vital
and important concern."' 39 In practice, the "compelling interest"
component of the strict scrutiny test has been a powerful tool that the Court
has used to invalidate numerous unlawful restrictions on free speech."4'
In other contexts, such as in modem Equal Protection analysis, the
"compelling interest' requirement of the strict scrutiny test is an exacting
standard,' 4 ' characterized by one commentator as being "strict in theory
and fatal in fact."'42 A "substantial interest" requirement, on the other
hand, is a standard normally reserved for lessened degrees of scrutiny. 43
The Court's use of the term "substantial" is best understood to mean
135. Redish, supra note 113, at 127.

136. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). In fact, the Court used a variety
of terms to describe this governmental interest, including "subordinating," "paramount," "cogent,"
and "strong." Id. at 376-77.
137. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (applying "time,

place, and manner" test).
138. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
139. Redish, supra note 113, at 144.
140. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating city
ordinance which exempted labor picketing from general ban on picketing).

141. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidotti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (using strict scrutiny to invalidate a
child custody award based upon race as violative of the Equal Protection Clause).
142. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term: Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,

8 (1972) (quotations omitted).
143. See supra note 137.
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"having substance" or "not imaginary," rather than meaning "considerable"
or "large.""M In light of the widely divergent meanings the Court has
given to "compelling" and "substantial," it is hard to imagine why the
O'Brien Court would use them interchangeably.
In using the term "compelling," it was most likely the Court's
intention to give the impression that the O'Brien test would provide a
rigorous, demanding scrutiny. Any such impression was quickly dispelled
in its first application, however, as the Court upheld the federal statute
prohibiting the destruction of draft cards and reinstated O'Brien's conviction." Since O'Brien, the Court has applied the O'Brien test in the same
deferential manner, causing it to be viewed by some as nothing more than
a rational basis" test.1 In the words of Professor Ely, the O'Brien test,
"honestly applied, will invalidate nothing."147
B. Application of the O'Brien Test to Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.
Even though nude dancing is not regarded by the Court as fully
protected speech,'"M based on the foregoing discussion, the O'Brien test
provided a seriously deficient level of protection for the expressive activity
sought to be regulated in Barnes. The O'Brien test, it will be shown, was
an inappropriate analysis. 49
Barnes demonstrates precisely the situation to which Justice Harlan
referred in his separate opinion in the O'Brien decision. Though he
concurred in the result, Justice Harlan was concerned with the test's ability
to address future cases presenting First Amendment issues more intricate
than those encountered in O'Brien. In the following passage, the Justice
correctly predicted the difficulty with the O'Brien test currently presented
in Barnes:
I wish to make explicit my understanding that [the O'Brien test]
does not foreclose consideration of... those rare instances when
an "incidental" restriction upon expression, imposed by a
144. Alfange, supra note 121, at 23.
145. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 386 (1968).
146. See Ely, supra note 130, at 1486 n.18; Stone, supra note 130, at 50; Day, supra note
130, at 505.
147. Ely, supra note 130, at 1490.
148. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2456,2460 (1991) (plurality opinion) (nude
dancing within "outer perimeters" of First Amendment protection); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422
U.S. 922, 932 (1975) (nude dancing involves only "barest minimum" of protected expression).
149. See infra part IV.D.
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regulation which furthers an "important or substantial" governmental interest and satisfies the Court's other criteria, in practice
has the effect of entirely preventing a "speaker" from reaching a
significant audience with whom he could not otherwise lawfully
communicate."50

Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. presents one of those instances of which
Justice Harlan has warned. Even if Indiana's facially neutral public
indecency statute satisfies O'Brien's requirements, application of the
O'Brien test in Barnes certainly has the effect of entirely preventing a
group of speakers from meaningfully reaching their audience. The dancers
cannot otherwise lawfully communicate their precise message to their
intended audience. Wearing pasties and G-strings, the dancers in Barnes
cannot convey a message with quite the same emotional impact as when
they are nude.'
Recognizing the communicative impact of the speech
at issue in Barnes, Judge Posner, in the Seventh Circuit's en banc ruling,
astutely observed that, in today's moral climate, a striptease leaving the
stripper clothed would lack "erotic punch."'" Application of the O'Brien
test in this context, therefore, serves to ban an entire category of expression-totally nude dancing-thereby preventing the dancers at the Glen
Theatre from communicating their unique message.
It should be noted that O'Brien did not present such a case. That is,
application of the test did not have the effect of preventing Mr. O'Brien
from reaching his audience.'
If Mr. O'Brien had burned a copy or
replica of his draft card on the courthouse steps, his message would have
retained all of its force and emotional impact, yet his actions would have
been in compliance with the federal statute.' 5 This presents a significant
distinction between the facts of O'Brien and those of Barnes.
In the face of this distinction, the Court applied the O'Brien test to
Barnes. Not surprisingly, the results are troubling. The Court's analysis
under the various prongs of the test was scant and conclusory. A more
detailed analysis reveals that the plurality's application of the O'Brien test's
four criteria to Barnes was at best flawed.
150. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1968) (Harlan, ., concurring).
151. See Barnes, 111 S.Ct. at 2474 (White, J.,
dissenting).
152. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1091 (7th Cir. 1990) (en band)
(Posner, I., concurring), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 11 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
153. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 389 (Harlan, 3., concurring).
154. See TRME, supra note 8,§ 12-23, at 983.
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1. Within the Constitutional Power of the Government
O'Brien's first requirement, that the regulation be within the constitutional power of the government, is not a significant part of the test's freespeech analysis. In fact, Professor Ely characterizes the O'Brien test as a
three-pronged inquiry, disregarding the first criterion. 155 Accordingly,
since it did not play an important role in the Barnes Court's analysis,
further discussion of the first prong, for the purposes of this Note, would
not be profitable.
2. Substantial Governmental Interest
The plurality's application of O'Brien's second criterion is the most
disturbing part of the opinion. After a lengthy discussion leading to the
determination that the protection of public morality was generally within
the constitutional power of the states, the plurality quickly concluded:
"Thus, [Indiana's] public indecency statute furthers a substantial governmental interest in protecting order and morality." 56 Nothing further was
said on the issue.'"
While the members of the plurality regarded the satisfaction of the
second prong to be a foregone conclusion, the remaining six Justices
carefully considered the question and came to a contrary result. Disbelief
that the protection of morality was a sufficient interest in this case was
precisely what motivated Justice Souter to write a separate opinion.'
Siding with the plurality on all other points, Justice Souter could not rest
his concurrence on the "sufficiency of society's moral views to justify the
(free speech] limitations at issue .... ,1S9
Justice Scalia was also moved to address this point in his concurring
opinion. The Justice was disturbed by the plurality's misplaced reliance on
precedent in their application of O'Brien's second criterion. Justice Scalia
pointed out that the cases cited by the plurality 60 did not stand for the
16
proposition that the protection of morality was a substantial interest. 1
155. See Ely, supra note 130, passim.
156. Barnes, 11 S. Ct. at 2462 (plurality opinion).
157. Ld.

158. Id. at 2468 (Souter, 3., concurring).
159. I See infra part IV.C.
160. In its discussion, the plurality cited Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973),
and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2462.

161. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,, 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2467 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Rather, in those cases, the government's interest amounted to nothing more
than "a rational basis for regulation."162 Justice Scalia noted that in
Paris Adult Theatre I, because the material sought to be prohibited was
obscene, the state's interest in maintaining a decent society provided a
"legitimate basis" for regulation. 63 The Justice also pointed out that in
Bowers, the Court held that to comply with the Due Process Clause,
society's moral views provided a "rational basis" for prohibiting homosexual sodomy.'" Upon exposing this flaw in the plurality's reasoning,
Justice Scalia expressed his dissatisfaction with "a method of analysis
[requiring] judicial assessment of the importance of government interests-and'' 65especially of government interests in various aspects of
morality. I
Academic critics of the Barnes decision have also been uneasy with
the proposition that the protection of morality might advance a substantial
governmental interest. Harvard Law Professor Kathleen Sullivan observed
that "[Barnes] happens to be the first time ever that mere moral disapproval
has counted enough to satisfy any standard of scrutiny stricter than mere
rationality review."''
Another commentator, also unconvinced that
society's moral views can raise a substantial interest, stated the larger
problem:
A great deal of expressive conduct with a weightier claim to First
Amendment protection than nude dancing can also give offense
to majoritarian morality and might be threatened if the Court were
to balance the value of [the] particular
expression against state
67
interests in order and morality.
How then, in light of the compelling arguments to the contrary, could
the plurality have determined in such a conclusory fashion that moral
disapproval provided Indiana with a substantial interest for prohibiting nude
dancing?1" The answer is probably bound up in the criticisms advanced
earlier that the O'Brien test provides an inadequate level of scrutiny arising
in part from a highly deferential application. 169 The O'Brien test, it has
been said, has a propensity for "mechanical applications that crank out
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2468 (citing Paris,413 U.S. at 59-60) (quotations omitted).

164. h. (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196).
165. Id at 2467 (quotations omitted).
166. ConstitutionalLaw Conference, 60 U.S.L.W. 2253, 2265 (Oct. 22, 1991).
167. Stuart Taylor, Jr., 1st Amendment Peril: Bad Issues Making Worse Law, NJ. LJ.,Aug.
29, 1991, at 66.
168. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., II1 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (1991) (plurality opinion).
169. See infra part IV.A.2.
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results without any true balancing of the interests at stake. 170 Consequently, with the practical significance attached to the term "substantial" in
the second criterion, the Court all but guarantees that the O'Brien test will
If Professor Geoffrey Stone'72 is correct
provide no protection at all.
in saying that "Itihe test of a test is not its formulation, but its application,"'7 3 then it is likely the O'Brien test has failed.
3. Unrelated to the Suppression of Expression
The third criterion of the O'Brien test requires that the government's
purpose be unrelated to the suppression of expression.' 74 This criterion
is, in effect, a requirement that the law be content-neutral .'n That a
regulation does not satisfy the third criterion does not necessarily mean that
the law is unconstitutional. It means only that the inquiry will be shifted
to the Court's "first track" analysis. 76 Accordingly, the Court has
suggested that this criterion serve as the threshold question for the other
prongs in the test.' 77
The plurality held that Indiana's asserted interest in protecting order
and morality was unrelated to the suppression of expression. 78 There is
strong evidence to the contrary, however. The statute suppresses the erotic
message conveyed by totally nude dancing in favor of the less offensive
one expressed when the dancers wear pasties and G-strings. As the dissent
aptly noted, nudity is not merely incidental conduct, but rather part of the
message to be conveyed, and thus itself constitutes expression. 179 Pasties
and G-strings therefore have the effect of changing the dancers' message.'
Since Indiana permits the dancers to perform if they wear pasties
and G-strings but forbids them from dancing when nude, it is precisely
because of the distinctive, expressive content of nude dancing, therefore,
170. Werhan, supra note 112, at 655 n.124.
171. Ely, supra note 130, at 1485-86.
172. Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
173. Stone, supra note 130, at 52.
174. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
175. See Day, supra note 130, at 505.
176. See supra part MJ.A; see also Ely, supra note 130, at 1484 ('more demanding" analysis
applied to regulations failing O'Brien's third prong).
177. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 81 n.4 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Buckley v. Valeo. 424 U.S. 1, 65 n.76 (1976) (per curiam).
178. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2456, 2462-63 (1991) (plurality opinion).
179. See id at 2474 (White, L dissenting).
180. See i,&
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that the state seeks to apply its prohibition.'
In Texas v. Johnson," 2 the Court expressed its view toward governmental restrictions that turn on the expressive nature of conduct:
The government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word.
It may not, however, proscribe particular conduct because it has
expressive elements. [The First Amendment] makes the communicative nature of conduct an inadequate basis for singling out
that conduct for proscription. 3
The plurality maintained, however, that the statute in Barnes prohibited
nude dancing not because of its expressive qualities but because of the
nudity alone.'" Even if this were the case, a finding that the law is
unrelated to the suppression is still precluded because the nudity sought to
be prohibited is inextricably intertwined with the expression of the dance.
In Buckley v. Valeo,8 the Court held that federal limits on campaign
contributions failed O'Brien's unrelatedness requirement." 6 Distinguishing the regulation before it from the one in O'Brien, the Buckley Court
stated: "O'Brien was not a case where the alleged governmental interest
in regulating the conduct [arose] in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct [was] itself thought to be harmful."'7

Buckley has been interpreted to mean that a regulation aimed

only at conduct will nevertheless be considered related to the suppression
of expression
if the conduct it purports to restrict is "inevitably related" to
8
18

speech.

Applying this analysis to Barnes, the nudity Indiana seeks to restrict
is, by definition, inevitably related to nude dancing. Justice White,
dissenting in Barnes, explained that "nudity is itself an expressive
component of the dance, and not merely incidental conduct."'8 9 Thus,
following the reasoning in Buckley, Indiana's interest in protecting morality
arises in large measure because public nudity, which is inextricably
181. AL
182. 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (reversing a conviction for violation of Texas statute prohibiting

the desecration of the American flag).
183. Id. at 406 (quoted in Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2466-67 (Scalia, J. concurring)).
184. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (1991) (plurality opinion).
185. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
186. See id. at 16-17.
187. Ld.at 16 (quotations omitted).
188. See Day, supra note 130, at 509.
189. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., III S. CL 2456, 2474 (1991) (White, J., dissenting)
(quotations omitted).
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intertwined with nude dancing, is thought to be harmful. For this reason,
Indiana's public indecency law must be considered related to the suppression of expression.
The Court's decision in Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v.
Public Service Commission of New YorP 9° further illustrates this point.
In that case, the Court found that a regulation that prohibited the use of
inserts in utility bills to discuss political matters was related to the
suppression of expression."' Professor David Day'9 has advanced the
theory that since the restriction in Consolidated Edison amounted to a
complete ban on all billing inserts, the decision demonstrates that "subject
matter regulations" will fail O'Brien's unrelatedness prong. 93 As we
have seen, the restriction in Barnes also acted as a total ban. 9 Consequently, Indiana's public indecency law, as applied to nude dancing, must
also be considered a subject matter regulation and therefore related to the
suppression of expression.
Looking at Indiana's public nudity law in the light of the Court's
decisions in Johnson, Buckley, and ConsolidatedEdison, the position taken
by the plurality in Barnes appears untenable. The better conclusion seems
to be that, based upon Indiana's asserted interest of protecting the public
morals, the statute targets conduct that cannot be severed from its
expressive attributes. The regulation thus fails O'Brien's threshold
requirement of unrelatedness. Accordingly, the Barnes Court properly
should have subjected the law to strict scrutiny.
4. No Greater Than is Essential
The fourth criterion of the O'Brien test demands that the incidental
restrictions of the challenged regulation upon free speech be no greater than
is essential to achieving the government's purpose. 95 This is one variety
of the Court's narrow tailoring requirement. Since Indiana's public
indecency law operates to ban nude dancing altogether, a more rigorous
examination of this requirement than that performed by the plurality in
Barnes is necessary.
The plurality's analysis under the fourth criterion consisted of a brief
190.447 U.S. 530 (1980).
191. See id at 537.
192. Professor of Law, University of South Dakota School of Law.
193. See Day, supra note 130, at 513.

194. See supra part IV.B.
195. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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statement that Indiana's statute was "narrowly tailored."
The plurality
stated that the requirement that the dancers wear pasties and a G-string was
"an end in itself' and the "bare minimum" necessary to serve Indiana's
interest in the societal disapproval of nudity.19 It was upon these bare
conclusions that the plurality rested its determination that O'Brien's fourth
criterion was satisfied.1 9
The dissent did not agree that the Indiana statute was narrowly
tailored.'" Because they believed that Indiana's purpose was related to
the suppression of expression, the dissenters would have applied strict
scrutiny.'
Thus, the dissent's narrow tailoring analysis was conducted
as part of a discussion of the Court's strict scrutiny."' Believing that the
plurality's arguments overlooked the broader picture, Justice White wrote:
"Banning an entire category of expressive activity ... generally does not
satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement of strict First Amendment
scrutiny."'
Justice Harlan, in light of his concurrence in O'Brien,
undoubtedly would have shared this view.'
The dissent, using a
hypothetical presented by Justice Scalia in his concurrence,2 made its
point clear:
We agree with Justice Scalia that the Indiana statute would not
permit 60,000 consenting Hoosiers to expose themselves to each
other in the Hoosierdome. No one can doubt, however, that those
same 60,000 Hoosiers would be perfectly free to drive to their
respective homes all across Indiana and, once there, to parade
around, cavort and revel in the nude for hours in front of relatives
and friends. It is difficult to see why the State's interest in
morality is any less in that situation ... but clearly the statute
does not reach such activity.'
It is interesting that both the plurality and dissent addressed only the
question of whether the statute was "narrowly tailored" to its purpose.
196. Barnes, II1 S. Ct. at 2463 (plurality opinion).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 2475 (White, J.,
dissenting).
200. IM.at 2474.
201. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2475 (1991) (White, J.,
dissenting).
202. Id. at 2475.
203. See supra part IV.B.
204. Justice Scalia said, "The purpose of Indiana's nudity law would be violated, I think, if
60,000 fully consenting adults crowded into the Hoosierdome to display their genitals to one
another, even if there were not an unintended innocent in the crowd." Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2465

(Scalia, ., concurring).
205. Id. at 2475-76 (White, J.,
dissenting).
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Neither side conducted the precise inquiry directed by the O'Brien test's
fourth criterion: whether the restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are
no greater than is essential to achieve the state's purpose. The dissent
explained that it was applying the narrow tailoring requirement as part of
a strict scrutiny analysis.'
The plurality, on the other hand, never fully
u
accounted for its approach n The plurality simply concluded that the
statute was narrowly drawn.' ° This type of freewheeling approach has
provoked sharp criticism of O'Brien's fourth criterion from Professor Ely.
Pointing to the ambiguous and subjective nature of the fourth criterion,
Professor Ely assails the wide variability and unpredictability of the Court's
analysis when applying this prong.
In practice [the fourth criterion's] application involves a choice
between different conceptions of its standard, a choice made by
reference to factors neither O'Brien nor any other Supreme Court
decision has yet made explicit. This variability in the content of
criterion [four] is important: it reduces the reliability of what at
first might
seem to be the most restrictive element of O'Brien's
209
test.
Even if the plurality had articulated the precise inquiry-that the
statute in Barnes posed restrictions on First Amendment freedoms no
greater than was essential to promote the state's purpose-the "latent
ambiguity" in the fourth criterion would still exist. 2 10 Professor Ely
asserts that, "[w]eakly construed, [the fourth criterion] could require only
that there be no less restrictive alternative capable of serving the state's
interest as efficiently as it is served by the regulation under attack"'
In this case, as the plurality made very clear, nothing could be more
efficient than a total ban. Thus, by focusing on the efficiency of Indiana's
regulatory scheme and not on the restrictions being placed upon First
Amendment freedoms, the Barnes Court failed to conduct a meaningful
analysis. This characteristic of the Court's application of the fourth
criterion-appearing to conform to the criterion's requirements while never
really performing the true balancing seemingly demanded by the test-must
certainly lie close to the heart of all criticism of the O'Brien test.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 2475.
See id.at 2463 (plurality opinion).

Id.
Ely, supra note 130, at 1484.
14
Id. at 1484-85.
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C. The Secondary Effects of Nude Dancing:
Justice Souter's Concurrence Revisited

Justice Brennan, a champion of First Amendment values, 1 was the
previous owner of Justice Souter's seat on the Supreme Court. Because the
Barnes case was decided by a five-to-four margin, had Justice Brennan
heard the case, his vote presumably would have obviated the need for this
very discussion.213 Justice Souter's involvement in the Barnes case,
however, is significant for reasons other than Justice Brennan's departure.
Justice Souter refused to agree that Indiana's asserted purpose in
regulating for the public morality was a sufficient interest under the second
criterion of the O'Brien test.21" This criticism, as we have seen, uncovers
one of the difficulties of applying the O'Brien test to Barnes.215 Justice
Souter advanced another argument, however. He believed that Indiana's
purpose in combating the so-called secondary effects of nude dancing
advanced a sufficient interest.

16

This view is significant in that it

imputes a governmental purpose to the Indiana statute that, at first, appears
more likely to satisfy O'Brien'ssecond criterion than will the governmental
interest in the protection of morality.2 17
The Court has previously affirmed the right of the government to
regulate adult entertainment on the basis of combating its secondary
effects.

2 18

In

City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres,

Inc., 2 19 the Court

upheld an ordinance limiting the placement of adult theaters showing nonobscene nude films based on the city's asserted purpose of eliminating the
secondary effects caused by the presence of the theaters.2'
Playtime
Theatres is distinguishable from Barnes, however, in that the ordinance in
Playtime Theatres did not act as a total ban?21 In fact, the Playtime
Theatres Court's determination that the regulation was content-neutral
212. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (invalidating law prohibiting
flag burning); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (same); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (upholding law prohibiting "focused picketing").
213. See Taylor, supra note 167, at 66.
214. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring).
215. See supra part IV.B.
216. Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2468-69 (Souter, J., concurring).
217. See supra part IV.B.2.
218. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding zoning ordinance limiting movie
theaters showing non-obscene adult entertainment to a certain area).
219. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
220. Id. at 47.
221. Id. at 54.
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rested upon the observation that the ordinance left some areas of the city
open for the protected communication.m In Barnes, this was not the
case. Application of Indiana's public indecency law completely eliminated
nude dancing. While the Court has made it clear that the elimination of
secondary effects is a sufficient interest when the government seeks merely
to regulate adult entertainment, it is questionable that the Court would
uphold such an interest when the government seeks to ban a category of
adult entertainment completely. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in
the recent case of R.A.V v. City of St. Paul,2 expressed doubts that an
ordinance that completely proscribed a specified category of speech could
ever be considered to be directed only to the secondary effects of the
speech. 224 Thus it is likely that the words of Professor Sullivan would
reflect the Court's current position on secondary effects: "No one would
uphold a ban on political rallies because they may be assumed to lead to
litter and brawls."'
Justice Souter has been criticized for reaching his decision regarding
the secondary effects of nude dancing without the benefit of full briefing
by the parties.'
Professor Sullivan called the secondary effects issue a
"last minute" argument advanced by the state.22' Pointing to the lack of
proof in the record, she charged that Justice Souter just assumed that
prostitution and sexual assault go hand in hand with nude dancing.' 2
Professor Sullivan concluded that Justice Souter's opinion "was not based
on a shred of empirical evidence .... ."
More than a decade ago, the
Court was fully briefed on the issue of the secondary effects of adult
entertainment in Schad'ao Unpersuaded by the government's argument,
the Court found that live adult entertainment presented no unusual problems
that justified its total proscription. 1
This is not to say that Justice Souter's argument is without force. The
notion of prohibiting a category of offensive speech for its secondary
effects may, in some future case, attract a majority of the Court. It is
foreseeable that the Court might encounter a category of speech giving rise
222. Id
223. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
224. 1d at 2549.
225. Constitutional Law Conference, 60 U.S.L.W. 2253, 2266 (Oct. 22, 1991).
226. See id at 2265-66.
227. 1d at 2266.
228. Id at 2265.
229. Id at 2266.
230. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephrahn, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
231. See id at 73-74.
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to certain secondary effects, the elimination of which would provide
sufficient justification to ban the speech completely. But, given that the
Barnes Court stood eight-to-one on this issue, it is clear that nude dancing
is not such a category.
D. Content-Based

Even assuming that the four prongs of the O'Brien test were analyzed
thoroughly and applied correctly, a deeper problem remains. A compelling
case can be made that the public indecency statute in Barnes is contentbased. This conclusion would render the O'Brien test inapposite and shift
the analysis to the Court's first track, thereby subjecting Indiana's law to
strict scrutiny.
The O'Brien test was not designed to evaluate content-based restrictions of speech. 32 "By requiring that the governmental interest be
unrelated to the suppression of free expression, the Court made it clear that
the remainder of its analysis was intended solely for content-neutral restrictions."'
The Court emphasized this point in Spence v. Washington."'
In striking down a Washington statute that forbade the exhibition of a
United States flag with a peace symbol attached to it, the Court concluded
that because the government could not advance an interest unrelated to the
suppression of expression, the O'Brien test did not apply. 5
In light of this approach, it is especially troubling that the Court chose
to use the O'Brienformulation in Barnes. In RA.V, Justice Scalia, writing
for a majority which included Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, intimated that the regulation in Barnes was
content-based.3 6 In striking down a hate-speech ordinance as impermissibly based on subject matter, the majority in R.A.V referred to the nude
dancing in Barnes as a "content-based subcategory" of speech. 7
In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 38 the Court struck down an
ordinance that prohibited drive-in theaters from showing films depicting
232. See Werhan, supra note 112, at 659.
233. Redish, supra note 113, at 127 (quotations omitted).

234. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
235. Id.at 414 n.8.
236. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2546 (1992).
237. 1d. Justice Scalia went on to say that the speech in Barnes could be proscribed because
it was "swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech."
Id.
238. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
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nudity if the film was visible from any public place."

Although invalidating the statute on overbreadth grounds, the Court nevertheless concluded
that the statute was content-based.m The similarities between Erznoznik
and Barnes are striking. Each statute essentially prohibits nudity in public
places. The statute in Erznoznik aims only at nudity in films visible from
a public place while the statute in Barnes targets all public nudity. The
main distinction between the cases is that in Erznoznik pure speech was
being regulated, while in Barnes expressive conduct was at issue. The
Court found the law in Erznoznik to be content-based, and found the statute
in Barnes to be merely an "incidental" regulation. 1 Carrying out this
reasoning, the statute in Barnes would have been considered content-based
if it had sought to prohibit an expression of pure speech-the same nude
dancing, for instance, projected on television screens. While the difference
between pure speech and expressive conduct may help to assess the relative
values of each in the constitutional scheme, it does not follow that it should
form the basis for the distinction between content-based and content-neutral.
The Court has also found that the elimination of an entire category of
speech will cause a regulation to be considered content-based 22 In Boos
v. Bany, 3 the Court struck down a District of Columbia statute prohibiting the display of signs within 500 feet of a foreign embassy that tended
to bring that foreign government into public disrepute. 2 4 The Court
found that because the government had abolished an entire category of
speech (displays critical of foreign governments), the statute was impermissibly content-based. 5 While the difference between the two laws is
evident-the statute in Boos is content-based on its face, and the one in
Barnes is facially neutral-the effect of each statute is the same. Each law
eliminates a category of protected speech. Since the Boos Court did not
condition its analysis upon a finding that the statute was facially contentbased,2' the determination in Barnes must be the same: Indiana's statute,
by reason of its complete proscription of a category of speech, is contentbased.
Still, some would find the facial neutrality of the statute in Barnes to
239. Id. at 217.
240. Id at 211.
241. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., IlI S. Ct. 2456, 2461 (1991) (plurality opinion).
242. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
243. Id
244. Id
245. See id at 318-19.
246. See id
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be a principled distinction from the Boos decision. There nevertheless
remains another compelling basis for concluding that Indiana's effort to ban
nude dancing is content-based. Though no one can deny that Indiana's
public nudity law is content-neutral on its face, the same cannot be said of
the statute as enforced. Indiana's application of its public indecency statute
has not been evenhanded. Since it was enacted, the statute has not been
used to prosecute any acts of nudity in plays, ballet, or opera.247 In oral
argument to the Seventh Circuit, the Indiana attorney general conceded that
the respondents' same dance routines would be protected expression if they
had been, for example, part of a graduate Ph.D thesis.'
Northwestern University School of Law Professor Martin Redish
observes that exemptions carved out of seemingly content-neutral regulations tend to controvert any content-neutral justification asserted by the
government?' 9 "[The exemptions] reveal that the government does not
really believe that its asserted content-neutral justification is valid; for if it
were, the government would presumably not exempt anyone from the
regulation?"' 0 In Barnes, selective enforcement of the public indecency
law undercuts Indiana's content-neutral justification that the statute is a
general proscription of conduct. In other words, because the statute has
been applied only to "barroom style" nude dancing, Indiana's argument that
the statute is content-neutral is betrayed. As Justice White wrote for the
dissent in Barnes: "mhe State's failure to enact a truly general proscription requires closer scrutiny of the reasons for the distinctions the State has
drawn."'
Consequently, through selective enforcement of its public
nudity law, Indiana officials have created a content-based regulation.
Once it is determined that Indiana's attempt to eliminate nude dancing
is content-based, the O'Brien test does not apply and the analysis must shift
to the strict scrutiny of the Court's first track.' 2 That thestatute restricts
expressive conduct and not pure speech does not affect the inquiry. The
Court has said: "The First Amendment generally prevents government
from proscribing [pure] speech or even expressive conduct because of
247. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2473 (1991) (White, J., dissenting)
(relying on the affidavit of Sgt. Timothy Corbett).
248. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd
sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. CL 2456 (1991).
249. See Redish, supra note 113, at 145.
250. Id
251. Barnes, 111 S. CL at 2476 (White, J., dissenting).
252. See supra part lI.A.
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disapproval of the ideas expressed." 3 The Court has been unmistakably
clear that content-based restrictions are subjected to "the most exacting
scrutiny."2' 4 Once a strict scrutiny analysis is applied to Indiana's public
indecency statute, in view of the Court's belief that content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid,' 5 one would expect the statute to
fall.2%
V. RECOMMENDATIONS: A REEXAMINATION OF THE O'BRIEN TEST
To some, the O'Brien decision signalled the beginning of what has
become a gradual decline in the Court's willingness to uphold First
Amendment freedoms." 7 Professor Day charges that O'Brien, taken
together with the cases to which it was later applied, demonstrates "an
eroding judicial commitment to free speech values."" 8 Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc. has now brought the O'Brien test to the point where a
reexamination of its purpose and criteria is necessary. Part V explores the
possibilities of (1) reformulating the O'Brien test in a way that addresses
its most significant weaknesses, and (2) abandoning the O'Brien test as part
of the Court's First Amendment framework.
A. Reformulation: Alternative Channels of Communication
The greatest shortcoming of the O'Brien test, as Justice Harlan had
foreseen, is that it can permit the complete elimination of a category of
speech. 9 In other words, O'Brien presents no barrier to subject matter
regulations.'
The most worthwhile modification of the O'Brien test,
then, is one that will address this problem. Such a modification can be
achieved by amending the O'Brien test to include a requirement found in
another of the Court's tests-a requirement that the challenged regulation
leave open adequate alternative channels of communication.
In its First Amendment framework, the Court has developed another
253. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. CL 2538, 2542 (1992) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
254. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
255. R.A.V. 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
256. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. CL 2456, 2475 (1991) (White,
257. See Day, supra note 130, at 506.
258. Id
259. See suprapart IV.B.
260. See Day, supra note 130, at 513 n.179.

3.,

dissenting).
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test providing an intermediate level of scrutiny to regulations of speech:
the "time, place, and manner" test."
This test was formulated to
evaluate content-neutral regulations targeting only the time, place, or
manner of speech. 2 According to the test, a regulation is justified if it
is tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and leaves open
adequate alternative avenues of communication.o
In recent cases, the Court has equated the O'Brien and "time, place,
264
and manner" tests. In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
for example, the Court recognized that the two tests have much in
common.'
Each test applies only to content-neutral restrictions, each
requires an important governmental interest, and each contains some form
of narrow tailoring analysis. Further, the plurality in Barnes stated that the
"time, place, and manner" test "has been interpreted to embody266much the
same standards as those set forth in United States v. O'Brien."
Although the Court has declared the two tests to be nearly the same,
there is one critical difference. Only the "time, place, and manner" test
requires that the challenged regulation leave open adequate alternative
channels of communication. 7 This distinction goes directly to the heart
of the difficulty with the O'Brien test in cases like Barnes. Nevertheless,
the Barnes Court went on to apply only the O'Brien test with no further
mention of the "time, place, and manner" test or its requirement of
adequate alternative channels of communication. 2'
If the Barnes Court had applied the "time, place, and manner" test to
Indiana's public indecency law, the statute would necessarily have
failed.2' Because the statute bans all nude dancing, it does not leave
261. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288 (1984).
262. See Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 46-47.
263. I at 50.
264. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
265. See id. at 298 & n.8 (citing City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 80405, 808-10 (1984)).
266. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456,2460 (1991) (plurality opinion) (citation

omitted).
267. Compare United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) with City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986).
268. Barnes, 111 S. CL at 2460-61 (plurality opinion).
269. Cf. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76 (1981) (total exclusion of
adult entertainment does not leave open adequate alternative channels of communication). For
a good discussion of the "time, place, and manner" test as applied to Barnes see Campagne, supra
note 81, at 609-13.
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open adequate alternative channels of communicationY 0 Why then
would the Barnes Court, after announcing that the two tests are nearly the
same, apply the one that lacks the precise element necessary for meaningful
scrutiny of the statute at issue? If the Court is serious when it says that the
two tests embody the same principles and serve the same purposes, the
better approach is to combine the two tests.
Combining the two tests could be achieved simply by amending the
O'Brien test to include a fifth requirement that the challenged law leave
open adequate alternative channels of communication. Reformulating the
O'Brien test in this way would serve two important functions for the Court.
First, it would create an effective level of analysis for restrictions of
expressive conduct. This level of analysis, while certainly not strict
scrutiny, would ensure that restrictions like the one in Barnes will receive
more than just an illusory examination. Second, by combining the
important features of each, reformulation would clarify and effectuate the
Court's attempts to equate the O'Brien and "time, place, and manner" tests.
This would create one consistent level of scrutiny for all content-neutral
regulations of pure speech and expressive conduct alike. It is critical to
note, however, that reformulation of the O'Brien test would be a useless
task if the Court continued to apply the test in a way that ignores the freespeech side of the balance."' As with any test, the reformulated O'Brien
test would be effective only when earnestly and candidly applied to give
meaning to the free speech principles incorporated within it.
B. Abandonment: The Court's Content Distinction
The surest, and certainly the harshest way to deal with the problems
created by the O'Brien test would be to abandon it completely. This raises
the question: What would become of the Court's First Amendment
methodology? The answer might be found in ending the disparate
treatment of content-based and content-neutral regulations. Professor
Redish has urged the Supreme Court to abandon what he calls the "content
distinction" in the Court's approach to the First Amendment. 2
Professor Redish contends that the Court should treat content-based
and content-neutral regulations equally. The justification for such an
approach, he explains, is that:
270. See Redish, supra note 113, at 116.
271. See Werhan, supra note 112, at 673; see also supra part IV.B.2.
272. See Redish, supra note 113, at 114.
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[The content] distinction labor[s] under two misconceptions. The
first is that the interests and values of free expression are
necessarily more seriously threatened by governmental regulations
aimed at content than those which are not; the second is that it is
always possible to draw a conceptual distinction between contentbased and content-neutral regulations. 3
Professor Redish asserts that a "unified" approach to regulations of speech
is preferred. 4 Under this approach, all governmental regulations of
expression would be subjected to a form of strict scrutiny.? s Accordingly, every restriction of expression must demonstrate that it serves a
compelling interest and satisfy a demanding means analysis. 7 6
Professor Redish maintains that this approach would not alter the fact
that content-based restrictions can and should be overturned more often
than content-neutral restrictions.'
This is not because content-neutral
regulations pose any less of a threat to First Amendment values. Rather,
it is because content-neutral regulations are more likely to withstand a
given level of scrutiny than will those that are content-based.27 This
unified approach also would not affect the categorical rules the Court has
created, such as for obscenity and fighting words. In fact, Professor Redish
asserts that his approach might lend itself to the creation of similar
categories for content-neutral restrictions. 279
While Professor Redish's proposal may seem like a radical departure
from the Court's established framework, a unified approach arguably
resembles a strict, traditional view of the First Amendment. Justice Black,
an ardent strict constructionist, has stated:
[I do not subscribe] to the doctrine that permits constitutionally
protected rights to be "balanced" away whenever a majority of
this Court thinks that a State might have interest sufficient to
273. Id.
274. Id. at 150.
275. See id. at 142.
276. See iU. at 142-43. Specifically, Professor Redish's approach asks:
(1) whether the regulation accomplishes the asserted goal; (2) whether "feasible" less
restrictive alternatives are inadequate to accomplish that end; and (3) whether the
speaker will have available adequate means to express the same views to roughly the
same audience. If the government satisfies the court that the first two factors are
present, the court should balance the compellingness of the state interest served by

the law against the availability of alternative means of expression to the speaker.
Redish, supra note 113, at 143.
277. See id at 134.

278. Id.
279. See id. at 144-45.
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justify abridgement of those freedoms .... I believe that the
First Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be no
abridgement of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that
the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the balancing that
was to be done ....
I fear that the creation of "tests" by which speech is left
...
certain circumstances is a standing invitation
unprotected under
2 0
iL
to abridge
Justice Black no doubt would have approved of Professor Redish's unified
approach. Abandoning the Court's content distinction would have the
effect of eliminating balancing tests such as the one in O'Brien which all
too often leave speech bare and unprotected.
VI. CONCLUSION

In the end, and in the name of morality, the Supreme Court in Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc., upheld Indiana's total ban on nude dancing. Almost
in direct defiance of the words of Justice Brennan that opened this Note,
the Court affirmed the government's ability to suppress the expression of
an idea precisely because society found that idea disagreeable. 1 Setting
aside the free-speech issues, the Barnes decision to some might recall the
puritanism of a time long since faded. Its holding is reminiscent of a
Victorian society where a woman's bare ankle could create a stir and "even
the legs of furniture were sometimes clad for the sake of decency."'
Indeed, in the midst of the debate, it is tempting to reject a marketplace-of-ideas approach and wonder why expression like nude dancing is
worth protecting at all. As a result, many will welcome the Barnes
decision as a triumph from a moral, ethical, or even religious standpoint. 3 In response, Justice Black's fierce dissent in Beauharnais v.
280. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61, 63 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (upholding
state's denial of bar admission for refusing to answer questions regarding Communist Party
membership).
281. See supra text accompanying note 1.
282. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1091 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Posner, J., concurring), rev'd sub noan. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2456 (1991).
283. To illustrate, such groups as the American Family Association, National Family Legal
Foundation, and Children's Legal Foundation, among others, filed briefs as amici curiae on behalf
of the petitioners in Barnes. See Briefs for the Petitioners, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S.
Ct. 2456 (1991) (No. 90-26).
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Ilinois' seems particularly apt: '1f there be... groups who hail this
holding as their victory, they might consider the possible relevancy of this
ancient remark:
Another such victory and I am undone."
David W. Stuart

284. 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding a ban on anti-racial leafletting).
285. Id at 275 (Black, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted).
* This Note is dedicated to Malcolm Stuart, a legal scholar at heart. The author would like
to thank Joslyn Salm for her valuable suggestions, patience, and support.

